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A B S T R A C T
This article focuses on one of the most likely empirical manifestations of the ‘‘environment-conﬂict’’
claim by examining how demand for and supply of water may lead to domestic water conﬂict. It also
studies what factors may reduce the risk of conﬂict and, hence, induce cooperation. To this end, the
article advances several theory-based arguments about the determinants of water conﬂict and
cooperation, and then analyzes time-series cross-section data for 35 Mediterranean, Middle Eastern, and
Sahel countries between 1997 and 2009. The empirical results show that demand-side drivers, such as
population pressure, agricultural productivity, and economic development are likely to have a stronger
impact on water conﬂict risk than supply-side factors, represented by climate variability. The analysis
also reveals that violent water conﬂicts are extremely rare, and that factors conducive to restraint, such
as stable political conditions, may stimulate cooperation. Overall, these results suggest that the joint
analysis of demand, supply, and restraint improves our ability to account for domestic water-related
conﬂict and cooperation.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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A number of recent studies have argued that there is a long-
term trend toward a reduction of violence in human affairs, both at
the international and the domestic level (Goldstein, 2011; Pinker,
2011). However, while there seems to be widespread agreement
on this trend, we are far from reaching consensus about its causes
(Blattman and Miguel, 2010) or on the prospects that it will
continue (Gleditsch et al., 2013). In fact, a rather pessimistic view is
found in the environmental-security literature, warning that the
unsustainable use of natural resources and the ensuing environ-
mental degradation may generate violent conﬂict over scarce
natural resources (Ba¨chler, 1999; Homer-Dixon, 1999; Kahl, 2006).
Inspired by the debate around the notion of ‘‘limits to growth’’
(Meadows et al., 1972), social scientists have picked up on a
long-standing argument initiated by Malthus (1798/1993), who* Corresponding author at: Department of Government, University of Essex,
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.11.018focused on how increasing scarcities may lead to violent conﬂict
(Buttel et al., 1990). As outlined in his An essay on the principle of
population, Malthus primarily considered the impending gap
between food production and population pressure. More recently,
concerns have been voiced over social consequences of a broader
range of scarcities and (human-induced) environmental degrada-
tion (Hauge and Ellingsen, 1998; Gleditsch, 2003). Increasing water
scarcity has been a key element in this literature, provoking scholars
and policymakers alike to foresee future ‘‘water wars’’ (see Ward,
2002; Katz, 2011; Theisen et al., 2011). Projections of severe, human-
induced climate change with its effects on the water supply in many
parts of the world have boosted such neo-Malthusian fears.
A contrasting view is offered by cornucopians, who argue that
scarcities can be overcome by human ingenuity, technological
progress, the wise use of market mechanisms, or social and
political institutions that promote cooperation (Simon, 1989,
1996; Lomborg, 2001; Kenny, 2011). For example, Wolf (1998)
analyzes the patterns of state interactions over international
freshwater resources and contends that resource competition is
more likely to be accompanied by cooperation rather than conﬂict.
Similar disagreements run through the recent literature on the
security implications of climate change. Pessimists predict an
increased frequency and severity of armed conﬂicts as global
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conﬂict potential of climate change as small or overshadowed by
more traditional determinants of violent conﬂict (see Buhaug,
2010; Bernauer et al., 2012b; Gleditsch, 2012).
In this article, we re-examine this controversy within a broader
theoretical framework. Speciﬁcally, we focus on the demand for
and supply of water resources, while also considering factors that
may be conducive to restraint between the actors involved. To
empirically test our arguments, we rely on time-series cross-
section data on domestic water conﬂict and cooperation in 35
Mediterranean, Middle Eastern, and Sahel countries for 1997–
2009: the water-related intrastate conﬂict and cooperation
(WARICC) data by Bernauer et al. (2012a). We show that
demand-side drivers, such as population pressure, agricultural
productivity, and economic development, are likely to have a
stronger impact on water conﬂict risk than supply-side factors,
represented by climate variability. We also ﬁnd that violent water
conﬂicts in the study region are extremely rare, and that factors
conducive to restraint, such as stable political conditions, may lead
to cooperation. Overall, our analysis suggests that the joint analysis
of demand, supply, and restraint improves the ability to account for
domestic water-related conﬂict and cooperation.
The next section brieﬂy reviews the existing (mainly empirical)
literature on environmental degradation and conﬂict/cooperation.
We then present the theoretical framework, where we classify our
explanatory factors as representing demand, supply, and restraint.
Next, we outline the research design and describe the empirical tests
of our hypotheses. After discussing the ﬁndings, we conclude with an
assessment of remaining gaps and ideas for further research.
2. Existing research on environmental factors and domestic
conﬂict or cooperation – a short overview
There is a long tradition of empirical work on the security
implications of environmental change in general and water
scarcity in particular. The evidence offered by this literature is
mixed, however. Whereas some single or comparative case studies
contend that environmental stress is likely to lead to violent
conﬂict (e.g., Libiszewski, 1996; Suliman, 1996; Homer-Dixon,
1999; Kahl, 2006), others argue that resource scarcity plays only a
minor role in generating conﬂict (e.g., Benjaminsen, 2008; Kevane
and Gray, 2008; Witsenburg and Adano, 2009). The discrepancy in
conclusions between these works may be understood in part as a
result of which cases have been analyzed. A limitation of the case-
study tradition is its near-exclusive selection of cases involving
conﬂict: a research design that fails to shed light on the absence of
violence in other countries with similar scarcities or environmen-
tal problems (Gleditsch, 1998). In turn, this makes it difﬁcult to
draw ﬁrm conclusions across a wider range of countries and to
generalize results.
The recent emergence of climate change as a major issue on
policy agendas has led to a revival of the neo-Malthusian argument
and a wave of quantitative studies examining possible links
between climate variability and domestic violence. The bulk of this
research provides little evidence for a powerful direct link between
climate change or variability and armed conﬂict (Bernauer et al.,
2012b; Deligiannis, 2012; Gleditsch, 2012; Scheffran et al., 2012;
Meierding, 2013; Theisen et al., 2011; however, see also Hsiang
et al., 2013), however, and research that ﬁnds signiﬁcant effects
does not agree on the direction of the relationship (for contrasting
examples, see Theisen, 2008; Burke et al., 2009; Buhaug, 2010;
Ciccone, 2011; Fjelde and von Uexkull, 2012; Hendrix and
Salehyan, 2012; Koubi et al., 2012; Raleigh and Kniveton, 2012;
Wischnath and Buhaug, 2014).
There is less statistical work addressing the effects of
environmental change on a broader spectrum of interaction typesand most of the relevant research concerns international river
basins in interstate relations (e.g., Wolf et al., 2003; Furlong et al.,
2006; Mitchell and Hensel, 2007; Brochmann and Hensel, 2009;
Bernauer and Kalbhenn, 2010; De Stefano et al., 2010; Kalbhenn,
2011; Brochmann, 2012; Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2012). The
predominant ﬁnding from this literature is that cooperative
interactions are more prevalent than conﬂictive interactions and
that water-related international interactions involving violence
are rare. Yet, it remains unclear whether this pattern is detectable
also at a domestic level of interaction. In contrast to mainstream
comparative climate-conﬂict studies, which rely on binary
indicators of conﬂict/no conﬂict or event counts, our work is
based on data (Bernauer et al., 2012a) that consider cooperation
and conﬂict as relative phenomena along a common continuum
(see also Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008; Zeitoun et al., 2010) and
use issue coding to identify the issue at stake in each case (e.g., the
quality of water supply in a city). This approach allows conﬂict and
cooperation over domestic water issues to co-exist.
3. A theory of domestic water conﬂict and cooperation:
demand, supply, and restraint
Water is an essential resource for human beings and it always
features high on lists of scarce resources that may be worth
ﬁghting for, particularly in dry areas such as the Mediterranean
region, the Sahel, or the Middle East (Libiszewski, 1996; Bernauer
and Kalbhenn, 2010). Most writings in the neo-Malthusian
tradition assume that the balance between the supply of and
demand for scarce resources is important in generating social
conﬂict (e.g., Percival and Homer-Dixon, 2001, p. 14). Unfortu-
nately, the literature remains vague on which of the two is more
relevant in generating conﬂict, and few studies have assessed this
dynamic empirically (see Beck and Bernauer, 2011). The third
causal component that we will consider here, i.e., restraint, is
mostly absent from this previous research or it is implicitly
assumed to be working through the other two mechanisms.
Against this background, we deﬁne domestic-level water
conﬂict as unilateral actions by individuals, ﬁrms, NGOs, or state
authorities, or interactions between them over water-related issues
that are likely to or actually worsen the water quality/quantity at
the domestic level. Conversely, we deﬁne domestic-level water
cooperation as unilateral actions by individuals, ﬁrms, NGOs, or
state authorities, or interactions between them over water-related
issues that are likely to or actually improve the water quality/
quantity at the domestic level. While cooperation and conﬂict can
co-exist, we expect that water conﬂict is more likely when the
demand for water is high, its supply low, and restraint against
conﬂict ineffective. In turn, we generally expect more cooperation
over water issues to arise when there is lower demand, higher
supply, and more effective restraint. This argument is partially
based on the idea that actors increase cooperative actions in
anticipation of conﬂict in the future and mirrors Zeitoun and
Mirumachi (2008, p. 300): ‘‘tensions rising from the distributional
nature of water conﬂicts – that is, scrambles for a larger share of
the pie – would be reduced, as the pie itself is enlarged.’’
3.1. Demand
A major driver of freshwater demand is population pressure,
which is at the core of the original Malthusian model and remains
central to today’s scenarios of future water stress. The logic is simple:
higher population density, all else held constant, increases the
demand for water and may also amplify inequality in access to this
resource (e.g., Matthew and Gaulin, 2001; Gizelis and Wooden,
2010). According to a recent UNEP (2008) report, one-third of the
African population now lives in drought-prone areas, and almost all
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2025. Africa is projected to increase from 1 billion people today to
over 4 billion in 2100 (UN, 2013) and population density grows with
it. Lower population density is likely to be associated with lower
water demand, less conﬂict, and with more cooperation, because
conﬂict may be anticipated due to population growth in the future.
A second demand factor is agricultural productivity, which
reﬂects the interaction between domestic institutions and environ-
mental pressures. These processes are linked to domestic water-
related conﬂict and cooperation (Matthew and Gaulin, 2001; Gizelis
and Wooden, 2010). The agricultural sector competes with urban
and municipal water users and higher agricultural productivity may
to increase the pressure on local water resources (Gizelis and
Wooden, 2010, p. 448). This may also apply to virtual water–water
used in the production process of goods that are consumed in
elsewhere (Allan, 1997; Hoekstra, 1998). Virtual water through
imports might therefore decrease pressure on local water resources
in dry areas, because the water for production is used elsewhere. On
the other hand, virtual water might also increase the pressure on
water resources in dry areas if products are exported and, hence, the
area is deprived of some of its own water. However, increasing a
country’s food imports (i.e., importing virtual water) and drawing on
an exogenous water source is only one side of the coin, since
domestic agriculture is often a highly politicized topic and is rarely
treated in a purely pragmatic way. Due to our sole focus on domestic
demand factors and limitations in data availability on virtual water
ﬂows, we do not consider the concept of virtual water in our
theoretical argument here.
Even in the absence of signiﬁcant population pressure, the
demand for freshwater in low- and middle-income countries is
likely to increase with economic development and related
processes, such as industrialization, energy production, health
and sanitation developments, or changing food habits, including
the expansion of irrigation systems in arid regions (Hoekstra and
Chapagain, 2006; Gleick, 2011). Only in wealthy and technologi-
cally advanced societies is the net effect of additional development
likely to lower the mean water consumption per capita (i.e.,
increasing efﬁciency and substitution strategies outweigh increas-
ing demand from changing consumption habits). Note that
economic development may also be seen as a supply and a
restraint factor, which we discuss below.
This reasoning seems at odds with empirical research that ﬁnds
low economic development, typically measured by a state’s income
level, to be a robust correlate of civil war (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006;
Ward et al., 2010). Wealthier societies are on average less exposed to
armed domestic conﬂict, whether because of individual opportunity
costs (Collier and Hoefﬂer, 2004) or state capacity (Fearon and Laitin,
2003). But that literature only considers the extreme outcome of
civil war and offers little insight into the dynamics within the
especially heterogeneous sample of lower-level violence in this
study. These rationales lead us to the ﬁrst set of hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a. Higher population density is more likely to in-
crease the risk of domestic water conﬂict than the probability of
water cooperation.
Hypothesis 1b. Higher agricultural productivity is more likely to
increase the risk of domestic water conﬂict than the probability of
water cooperation.
Hypothesis 1c. Higher economic development is more likely to
increase the risk of domestic water conﬂict than the probability of
water cooperation.
A corresponding argument can be made for domestic water
cooperation. Factors such as population density, agriculturalproductivity, and economic development increase pressure on
water resources and the competition for these resources can create
tensions between different water users. In turn, these tensions
create pressure on water-managing institutions to ﬁnd solutions
for allocation problems in order to avoid conﬂicts over water.
Provided that a state is equipped with functioning management
institutions, water scarcity could lead to cooperative solutions
(Ostrom, 1992; GWP, 2000; Baland and Platteau, 2003; Swynge-
douw, 2004) for water allocation, innovative technologies, or new
ways of water exploitation. Thus, increased competition for water
provides a strong incentive for cooperation. This counterargument
leads us to a second, and contradictory, set of hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1d. Higher population density is more likely to in-
crease the probability of domestic water cooperation than the risk
of water conﬂict.
Hypothesis 1e. Higher agricultural productivity is more likely to
increase the probability of domestic water cooperation than the
risk of water conﬂict.
Hypothesis 1f. Higher economic development is more likely to
increase the probability of domestic water cooperation than the
risk of water conﬂict.
Ultimately, however, whether the ﬁrst set of arguments or the
counterarguments are more inﬂuential on domestic water conﬂict
and cooperation has to be assessed empirically.
3.2. Supply
The supply of water is usually determined by natural factors,
the most prominent being seasonal variations and long-term
changes in climate patterns. The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) deﬁnes climate as ‘‘average weather,’’
usually over a 30-year period. Given our focus on short-term
changes in supply, we will refer to this factor as ‘‘climate
variability’’ rather than ‘‘climate change.’’
The level of precipitation and temperature from one year to the
other are manifestations of climate variability. It affects evapo-
transpiration as well as snow cover, which in some regions acts as a
natural reservoir of freshwater that eventually becomes available
downstream during the summer months (Parry et al., 2007). While
anthropogenic climate change will impact average levels of water
availability in the longer term, the main human determinants of
supply in a shorter perspective are found in the form of dams and
reservoirs, which regulate water ﬂow and make water supply more
manageable and predictable (but may also create ecological
problems and societal challenges downstream), as well as
groundwater extraction and desalination of sea water. In most
societies, including the study region of our analysis, temporal and
spatial variations in precipitation and temperature patterns give a
representative image of variations in local water supply. That being
said, water supply is more than a simple function of deviations in
rainfall and temperature patterns. Water storage capacities in the
form of reservoirs or dams, river ﬂows across water basins, and
general water dependency are likely to matter as well. Hence,
although we argue that temporal and spatial variations in
precipitation and temperature patterns give a representative
image of variations in local water supply, these variables might be
somewhat crude proxies. We return to this issue in the conclusion.
Against this background, we examine the following supply-side
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. More extreme climate variability is more likely to
increase the risk of domestic water conﬂict than the probability of
water cooperation.
ental Change 29 (2014) 337–3483.3. Restraint
We add the notion of restraint to these (neo-) Malthusian
hypotheses. Although resource scarcity of one kind or another is a
widespread condition, scarcity by itself does not lead to open
competitive confrontation and the eruption of armed conﬂict in
most cases. Hence, ‘‘something holds us back from violence,’’
although this ‘‘something’’ does not necessarily mean that conﬂict
is absent or that cooperation is given if we also consider non-
violent conﬂicts. In principle, there may be a host of factors that
determine a society’s restraint against escalating water conﬂicts,
but we focus on what is arguably the most important contextual
dimension, i.e., domestic institutional characteristics.
The ‘‘democratic peace’’ refers to the observation that
democracies rarely, if ever, ﬁght one another (e.g., Oneal and
Russett, 1999). Democracies are superior providers of public goods
and more likely to have stronger environmental policies to the
extent that they cooperate in ﬁnding joint solutions to environ-
mental problems (e.g., Payne, 1995; Lake and Baum, 2001;
Neumayer, 2002; Ba¨ttig and Bernauer, 2009). Thus, if water-
related social problems are amenable to solutions, they are less
likely to escalate to conﬂict in democracies. Indeed, Gizelis and
Wooden (2010) ﬁnd that democratic institutions mitigate the
impact of water scarcity on intrastate-armed conﬂict.
However, it has also been suggested that authoritarian regimes
are better able to address water allocation problems, because they
can impose policies and suppress opposition more effectively.
Bernauer and Siegfried (2007, 2012), for example, show that there
was less water-related conﬂict in the Aral Sea basin under Soviet rule
than in the somewhat more democratic post-Soviet environment.
Furthermore, increasing levels of democracy are likely to open up
more ‘‘political space’’ for people to express their grievances (see also
Payne, 1995) and to engage in conﬂictive interactions with other
water users or authorities that regulate water supply. Consequently,
the democratic restraint against environmental conﬂict may in fact
only kick in at relatively high (i.e., violent) levels of severity, implying
that we may expect an overall higher degree of water conﬂict in
democratic regimes than in non-democratic ones, although this
degree is unlikely to escalate to the use of armed force in
democracies. Based on this, we seek to test:
Hypothesis 3a. A higher level of democracy is more likely to
increase the risk of domestic water conﬂict than the probability
of water cooperation.
Another argument in the realm of political institutions concerns
political stability. Numerous studies have shown that both highly
authoritarian and highly democratic countries are more durable
and less exposed to violent internal power struggles than so-called
anocracies, i.e., unstable regimes located ‘‘between’’ pure autocra-
cies and democracies (Vreeland, 2008; Gleditsch et al., 2009). This
dynamic is likely to inﬂuence how water scarcity and distribution
challenges are handled (Bernauer and Siegfried, 2007). Our ﬁnal
hypothesis is then:
Hypothesis 3b. Higher political stability is more likely to increase
the probability of domestic water cooperation than the risk of
water conﬂict.
4. Research design
4.1. Data and dependent variables
To evaluate our hypotheses, we employ recently compiled
event data on water-related conﬂict and cooperation in 35
Mediterranean, Middle Eastern, and Sahel countries for 1997–
2009: the WARICC data by Bernauer et al. (2012a). In its original
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per water-related event. As indicated above, an event is deﬁned as
unilateral actions by individuals, ﬁrms, NGOs, or state authorities,
or interactions between them over water-related issues. The events
were coded from media reports retrieved from BBC Monitoring.
The potential for ‘‘media bias,’’ i.e., greater media attention in
countries with a free press (see, e.g., Li, 2005; Drakos and Gofas,
2006) is discussed in the appendix to the article presenting the
dataset (Bernauer et al., 2012a). Examples of typical events are
initial talks about the construction of a new water-supply network
to improve the water quality of a region; an agreement on that new
project that is signed a few months after the initial talks; and the
construction of the water-network. Although these hypothetical
events are obviously related, each event is considered separately
and assigned a value for the intensity of conﬂict or cooperation.
Events that do not result from human action, but are imposed by
nature (e.g., extreme weather events) are not coded. A detailed
description of the data is given in Bernauer et al. (2012a), but Figs. 1
and 2 here provide a short overview of countries and events. The
full dataset contains records of 10,352 water-related events.
The key variable in this dataset, the Water Events Scale (WES),
measures the intensity and impact of a domestic water-related
event in an ordinal fashion. This scale consists of 11 points, ranging
from 5 (most conﬂictive event) to +5 (most cooperative event).
Events assigned to the +5-category imply a very extensive role for
any kind of actor in trying to initiate or implement policies,
programs, or actions that substantially improve the quality or
quantity of water in the whole country. Only 70 events (0.68
percent of the sample) involve physical violence and are given the
maximum conﬂictive score of 5. There are 1780 conﬂictive non-
violent events (18 percent), while 3665 (35.40 percent) are
cooperative. Finally, about 47 percent of recorded events are
neither cooperative nor conﬂictive (i.e., neutral or the 0-category).
Evidently, violent water-related events are extremely rare and
studying only those would exclude the large majority of water-
related social interactions. Table 1 provides a more detailed
overview of the WES, while Table 2 illustrates the coding of this
measure with some examples.
We aggregate these data to the country-year, which serves as our
unit of analysis (N = 446 country-years). For the ﬁrst set of empirical
tests, we use the yearly mean value of the WES for each country as
the dependent variable. Note that median or weighted means also
seem appropriate for aggregating the WES values for the single
events into a country-year format. We carried out robustness checks
using such measures (mean, median, weighted means/medians by
cooperative and conﬂictive events, weighted means/medians by the
standard deviation, raw counts of conﬂictive and cooperative events,
and ratios of conﬂictive and cooperative events per country-year) to
ensure that our results are not artifacts resulting from a speciﬁc
aggregation strategy. We provide further details on these tests in the
online appendix, but note the ﬁndings presented below are robust to
using these alternative ways of aggregation.
The second set of empirical assessments, which builds on in-
sample and out-of-sample predictions, employs two dichotomous
variables: the ﬁrst (cooperation) receives a value of 1 if the mean
WES score in a given country year is positive (0 otherwise); the
second (conﬂict) receives a value of 1 if the mean country-year WES
score is negative (0 otherwise).
4.2. Explanatory variables – demand side
According to our theory, the following three demand facets are
likely to affect water resources and, therefore, also cooperation and
conﬂict: population density, agricultural productivity, and economic
development. Population density is measured as the midyear
population divided by land area in square kilometers. Additionally,
Fig. 1. Events coded by location in data, 1997–2009.
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Wooden (2010, p. 448) note that a country’s degree of agricultural
productivity measured as the ratio of the crop production index to
the percentage of agriculture land ‘‘captures demand-side water use0 500
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Table 1
Water events scale (WES).
Value Description Events recorded
5 Events that are likely to or do result in substantial improvement with respect to water quality/quantity in the country
as a whole.
31
4 Events that are likely to or do result in substantial improvement with respect to water quality/quantity at the regional
level within the
respective country.
111
3 Events of moderate intensity that may result in an improvement with respect to water quality/quantity at the regional or national
level within the respective country.
1138
2 Agreements signed or other measures formally adopted that signal commitment to improvement with respect to water quality/
quantity at the regional or national level.
985
1 Events that are likely to or do result in a very small improvement with respect to water quality/quantity at the local level. 1400
0 Routine and purposive actions on water issues that have no identiﬁable positive or negative impact on water quality/quantity. 4837
–1 Events that are likely to or do result in a very small negative impact on water quality/quantity at the local level. 639
–2 Tensions within government (intrastate) or between countries (inter-state) that may affect water quality/quantity at a
domestic level.
425
–3 Large-scale and general opposition of the public toward policies and actions that have negative implications for water quality/
quantity at the regional to national level.
328
–4 Events that are likely to or do result in a deterioration with respect to water quality/quantity at the regional level within the
respective country.
293
–5 Events that are likely to or do result in a deterioration with respect to water quality/quantity at the national level; physical
violence associated with water problems.
165
Total 10,352
Reproduced from Bernauer et al. (2012a, p. 537).
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natural log for the ﬁrst and third of these variables to deal with
skewed distributions and expected non-linear effects.
4.3. Explanatory variables – supply side
We measure climate variability with data for temperature and
precipitation. To this end, we include the absolute deviation of the
current level of precipitation and temperature, respectively, from
past long-run levels, i.e., the 30-year moving average (see IPCC,
2007; Koubi et al., 2012). Hence, we treat climate variability as a
large-scale phenomenon that is beyond human control at the local
level and within the short to medium term. The precipitation data,
measured in mm per year, are taken from the Global Precipitation
Climatology Center (GPCC) (Beck et al., 2004); the temperature
data are measured in degrees Celsius and stem from the University
of Delaware’s Global Surface Air Temperature Database (Matsuura
and Willmott, 2009). Both climate indicators are derived from
high-resolution statistics that were aggregated to the country level
using the PRIO-GRID framework (Tollefsen et al., 2012). Missing
climatological data for Malta and Monaco were replaced by data
for nearby areas in Italy and France, respectively.
4.4. Explanatory variables – restraint factors
For democracy, we rely on the polity2 variable from the Polity IV
dataset (Marshall and Jaggers, 2013). This item captures a state’sTable 2
WES with examples from data.
Value Description 
5 National emergency water plan is implemented – comprises mini st
from other dams, etc.
4 Ministerial meeting agrees to reduce price of water per cum. for She
3 Lebanon inaugurates water project 
2 Jordan and Italy sign agreement to ﬁnance water network project 
1 Workshop organized by ministry of mines, energy, and water resour
0 Algerian and Yugoslav business men discuss cooperation in different
–1 Janjawid militia controls water wells – residents of camp run out of
–2 Syrian-Israeli talks on reaching an agreement on water in Golan regi
–3 Niger delta rebel group complains about lack of water supply – expl
–4 Water supply is interrupted on island of Vis 
–5 People killed in tribal clashes over water points 
Reproduced from Bernauer et al. (2012a, p. 538).degree of democracy along three dimensions (Marshall and
Jaggers, 2013, p. 14): ‘‘the presence of institutions and procedures
through which citizens can express effective preferences about
alternative policies and leaders. Second, the existence of institu-
tionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive.
Third, the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily
lives and in acts of political participation.’’ The ﬁnal variable taken
from this dataset ranges between 10 (full autocracy) and +10 (full
democracy). Data for Bosnia and West Bank/Gaza are missing in
these data and we imputed values of zero to mitigate potential
consequences of missing data.
Second, political (in-) stability is measured by an indicator that
counts the number of years since a country entered the Polity IV
dataset in 1800 or had a three-point change (‘‘most recent regime
change’’) in the polity2 score in either direction of the scale over a
period of three years or less (Marshall and Jaggers, 2013, p. 17).
This coding rule also applies to the end of a transition period, i.e.,
‘‘the lack of stable political institutions’’ (Marshall and Jaggers,
2013, p. 17). As soon as such a change occurs, this count item is
reset to 0 and the count starts again. Hence, the higher the values
on this variable, the more politically stable a country.
4.5. Descriptive statistics and methodology
All right-hand-side variables are lagged by one year to
minimize endogeneity. Table 3 summarizes the descriptive
statistics and variation inﬂation factors (VIFs) of all variables inCountry Year
ations for desalination, drillings, transfers Algeria 2002
ikh-Zayed canal and pumping station Egypt 1999
Lebanon 2002
Jordan 2001
ces on the provision of potable water Mali 2003
 sectors – including water supplies and dams Algeria 1997
 water Sudan 2008
on – talks fail Israel 2000
icit warning against president Nigeria 2008
Croatia 2001
Ethiopia 2001
Table 3
Basic information on variables.
Obs. Mean SD Min Max VIF
WES – country-year mean 446 0.25 0.92 4 3
WES – cooperation dummy 446 0.56 0.50 0 1
WES – conﬂict dummy 446 0.25 0.43 0 1
Population density 446 4.22 1.65 0.83 9.78 1.41
Agricultural productivity 442 3.93 5.32 0 36.25 1.12
GDP per capita 430 7.89 1.74 4.73 12.13 2.81
Temperature – 30-year MA 446 0.25 0.44 1.12 1.34 1.08
Precipitation – 30-year MA 446 0.10 102.72 383.74 325.56 1.05
Democracy 446 2.50 6.43 9 10 2.12
Political stability 420 18.10 17.45 0 61 1.67
Note: ‘‘MA’’ in this and all subsequent tables refers to ‘‘moving average.’’
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have low levels of multicollinearity. All items display a VIF that is
well below the threshold level of 5. However, to control for any
remaining multicollinearity and to ensure the robustness of our
ﬁndings, we also run models where we introduce the variables on
demand, supply, and restraint separately into our estimations.
Our main empirical estimation strategy is based on a widely
used method for analyzing panel data, i.e., Prais–Winsten
regression models with panel-corrected standard errors and an
AR1 autocorrelation structure (Beck and Katz, 1995, 1996). This
approach controls for panel heteroskedasticity and contempora-
neous as well as serial correlation. Tests indicate that country-ﬁxed
effects are unnecessary in our case, and we also leave out a lagged
dependent variable. In sensitivity tests, however, we estimated
models with a lagged dependent variable that may model temporal
dynamics more accurately or year-ﬁxed effects that control for
exogenous system-wide shocks that are common to all countries in
our dataset. These results are virtually the same as the ones
reported below. This alternative speciﬁcation and other tests that
are not reported in the text are documented in the web appendix
and can be replicated with our replication data ﬁles.
Ward et al. (2010) remind us that drawing inferences from
statistically signiﬁcant results might be misleading in that they tell
us little about the predictive power of a covariate or an entire
model. To address this point, we assess the ability of our full model
(Model 4) to actually predict countries’ level of water-relatedTable 4
The determinants of domestic water-related conﬂict and cooperation.
Model 1 Mo
(Demand) (Su
Population density 0.036 
(0.023) 
Agricultural productivity 0.008 
(0.007) 
GDP per capita 0.138 
(0.033)***
Temperature – 30-year MA 0
(0.
Precipitation – 30-year MA 0
(0.
Democracy 
Political stability 
Constant 1.541 0.2
(0.313)*** (0.
Obs. 426 44
Wald x2 21.44*** 0.8
R2 0.05 0.0
Note: Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. A negative sign on a coefﬁcient i
*Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1% (two-tailed).cooperation or conﬂict by using in-sample and out-of-sample
prediction techniques that rely on the binary dependent variables
of water conﬂict and cooperation.
5. Empirical ﬁndings
Table 4 shows the results of our ﬁrst estimation strategy. Model
1 focuses on the demand-side variables. Model 2 and Model 3
employ the same approach, but for the supply-side and restraint
factors, respectively. Model 4 is the full model with all explanatory
variables.
The model-ﬁt statistics alone indicate that some of our
hypotheses are unlikely to hold. In particular, Model 2, which
exclusively looks at the supply-side variables, has virtually no
explanatory power and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that all
coefﬁcients in that model are jointly indistinguishable from 0. This is
mirrored by the coefﬁcients on climate variability as expressed by
temperature and precipitation deviations from the 30-year moving
average. While these coefﬁcients are negative, suggesting a conﬂict-
increasing effect of climate variability, they are not statistically
signiﬁcant in any model. We conclude that the impact of the supply-
side items is low at best. Despite our ‘‘more nuanced’’ focus on
domestic water-related conﬂict (most of which is non-violent) and
cooperation, our result is in line with previous research (e.g., Koubi
et al., 2012), which ﬁnds that there is little evidence for a direct
impact of climate variability on armed conﬂict onset.
With regard to the demand-side indicators, all three variables
have a negative sign, which corresponds to our theoretical
expectations. Most of their signiﬁcance levels are sensitive to
model speciﬁcations, though, and we cannot place much faith in
the revealed substantive impact of either population density or
agricultural productivity. Put differently, the signiﬁcance levels
depend on which explanatory variables we consider simulta-
neously in our models. These results are not surprising when
considering the two contradictory theoretical arguments relating
water demand to conﬂict and cooperation, though. Both explana-
tions have valid arguments for the occurrence of conﬂict and
cooperation, but it is difﬁcult to assess this question empirically
without data on water-management institutions. Nevertheless, the
demand-side variables do seem to perform better on average thandel 2 Model 3 Model 4
pply) (Restraint) (Full)
0.039
(0.046)
0.017
(0.006)***
0.133
(0.054)**
.060 0.081
084) (0.091)
.001 0.001
001) (0.001)
0.046 0.029
(0.010)*** (0.012)**
0.002 0.008
(0.003) (0.003)**
56 0.307 1.477
046)*** (0.067)*** (0.480)***
6 420 400
3 20.36*** 50.91***
0 0.05 0.09
ndicates a conﬂict-promoting effect with higher values on the covariate.
Table 5
The determinants of domestic water-related conﬂict and cooperation – probit
analyses.
Model 5 (
Cooperation)
Model 6
(Conﬂict)
Population density 0.007 0.120
(0.084) (0.099)
Agricultural productivity 0.005 0.030
(0.013) (0.009)***
GDP per capita 0.151 0.105
(0.075)** (0.091)
Temperature – 30 year MA 0.107 0.208
(0.139) (0.184)
Precipitation – 30 year MA 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Democracy 0.046 0.040
(0.018)** (0.020)**
Political stability 0.004 0.013
(0.006) (0.007)*
Constant 1.762 1.636
(0.445)*** (0.618)***
Obs. 400 400
Wald x2 107.37*** 61.00***
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.18
Note: The table entries are probit coefﬁcients. Standard errors clustered on country
in parentheses. Cooperation (conﬂict) years variable and cubic splines included in
both models, but not reported.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1% (two-tailed).
T. Bo¨hmelt et al. / Global Environmental Change 29 (2014) 337–348344the supply-side items. The ﬁt of Model 1 is higher than the ﬁt of
Model 2 and at least one of the demand-side inﬂuences reaches
conventional signiﬁcance levels in any model of Table 4.
The relatively stronger result for demand factors is primarily
driven by economic development as measured by GDP per capita.
Although GDP per capita has been identiﬁed as one of the most
robust negative inﬂuences on civil war (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006;
Ward et al., 2010), our models indicate that economically
developed countries are more likely to see water-related conﬂict.
A one-unit increase on this variable is associated with an increase
of about 14 percent on the WES variable. This ﬁnding supports our
theoretical argument that more economic development is
associated with increased consumption of natural resources in
general and freshwater resources in particular (Rock, 1998). In
turn, while more economic development may decrease the risk of
high-intensity civil conﬂict, it actually increases the probability
that a country experiences more low-intensity (non-violent)
disputes over water resources.
Coming to the restraint factors, these variables largely perform
as expected and reveal robust effects on domestic water-related
conﬂict and cooperation. Adding or suppressing variables from the
models does not alter these ﬁndings. According to Models 3 and 4,
the democracy impact is negative and signiﬁcant. A one-unit
increase on the democracy index is associated with a 3.75 percent
decrease on the WES on average. It seems that authoritarian
regimes can indeed solve water allocation problems more
effectively than democracies by imposing solutions and suppres-
sing opposition (Bernauer and Siegfried, 2007, 2012). This
interpretation is also in line with the claim that there is more
‘‘political space’’ in democracies for people to express their
grievances and engage in conﬂictive interactions with the
government (Payne, 1995).
It has been suggested that the conﬂict-increasing effect is likely
to fade or reverse at high levels of democracy and that democracy
is likely to conﬁne water conﬂict to non-violent forms. Hegre et al.
(2001) conclude that the relationship between democracy and civil
conﬂict follows an inverted U-shaped relationship, with the
highest risk of conﬂict in the semi-democratic (or anocratic) zone.
While such a curvilinear relationship is not detectable in our data,
we do ﬁnd that the apparent conﬂict-inducing effect of democracy
is reserved for non-violent water conﬂicts. Violent conﬂict over
water resources is overwhelmingly a non-democratic phenome-
non; only three of the 31 country-years in our data that saw at least
one violent event over water took place in democratic regimes – in
Italy, Croatia, and Israel. These descriptive statistics are further
supported by unreported regression estimations using either
violence onset in a country year or the number of water-related
casualties per year as dependent variables: democracy has a
negative, i.e., violence-dampening, and statistically signiﬁcant
impact.
Political stability has a conﬂict-reducing effect: the coefﬁcient
of this variable is positive and signiﬁcant in one out of two
models, meaning that higher levels of stability are associated
with more cooperative outcomes. The substantial impact of this
item is rather low, however. On average, we only see an increase
of about 1 percent in domestic water-related cooperative
behavior. Since this item only approaches statistical signiﬁcance
in one model, its impact is also likely to depend on model
speciﬁcation.
6. In-sample and out-of-sample predictions
We conducted a wide range of robustness checks to assess
whether our ﬁndings are sensitive to changes in model speciﬁca-
tions or estimation procedures. Here, we focus on in-sample and
out-of-sample predictions of domestic water-related conﬂict andcooperation. First, we replicated Model 4 from above in a probit
regression setup with different sets of cubic splines for temporal
correction (Beck et al., 1998). For these two models, we used the
dichotomous indicator of cooperation and conﬂict, respectively. As
demonstrated in Table 5, the results of these estimations do not
reveal substantial changes over Model 4. Thus, we proceed with
Fig. 3 that builds on the models in Table 5.
This ﬁgure summarizes one possible avenue of in-sample
prediction, i.e., the ordered grouping of the predicted probabilities
of either WES – cooperation dummy or WES – conﬂict dummy by
quintiles and comparing these with the actual instances of water
cooperation and conﬂict in our data. Using quintiles instead of
terciles seems more suitable with our events, since this reﬂects the
long tail in the distribution of the predicted probabilities more
accurately. We refer to the ﬁfth quintile as the ‘‘most likely’’ group,
the fourth quintile as the ‘‘moderately likely’’ group, and the
bottom three quintiles as the ‘‘least likely’’ group. The predictive
power of our full model is relatively high, regardless of whether we
focus on water conﬂict (right panel) or cooperation (left panel). The
ﬁfth and the fourth quintiles combined, i.e., the most and
moderately likely groups comprise 135/241 cooperative and 67/
98 conﬂictive events. Put differently, those predicted probabilities
that form these particular forecasting categories already predict 56
percent of water-cooperation years and 68 percent of water-
conﬂict years correctly. Consequently, only 106 country-years that
actually saw more cooperation than water-related conﬂict are
characterized as least likely cases, i.e., our model would not predict
that we observe a mostly cooperative behavior over domestic
water issues – although we did in reality. We ﬁnd a similar pattern
for conﬂict: 31 country-years that actually saw more conﬂict than
water-related cooperation are characterized as least likely cases. In
sum, this initial check of the in-sample predictive power seems
promising.
In Fig. 4, we show Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) plots
based on Table 5. Generally, models with more predictive power
generate ‘‘true positives at the expense of fewer false positives’’
(Ward et al., 2010, p. 366). A perfectly predictive model would
correctly classify all actual cases of water-related conﬂict or
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or cooperation predicted by our model, but not actually occurring.
Our models predict water-related conﬂict or cooperation by no
means perfectly, but they do have a higher predicted probability
for a randomly chosen positive event than for a non-event
(represented by the diagonal). This is mirrored by the area under
ROC curve statistic (AUC), which theoretically varies between 0.5
(no predictive power) and 1.0 (perfect predictive power). As
demonstrated by Figs. 3 and 4, our models that distinguish
between water cooperation and conﬂict perform well above
average in this regard, i.e., above an AUC of 0.5.
Finally, the question remains whether this conclusion holds for
the harder test of an out-of-sample prediction. We use a four-fold
cross validation quasi-experimental setup that was repeated ten
times (Ward et al., 2010, p. 370) – both for the full model that
employs WES – cooperation dummy as the dependent variable and
for a similarly speciﬁed model that examines WES – conﬂict
dummy. The exact procedure for this cross-validation is described
in Ward et al. (2010) and can be replicated with our data ﬁles. In
short, however: cross-validation relies on dividing existing data0
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Fig. 4. In-sample prediction: area under ROinto subsets, using random assignment of the cases to the different
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routinely estimated by applying the preferred model speciﬁcation.
Fig. 5 depicts our ﬁndings. As one would expect the predictive
power of either model decreases as compared to the in-sample
values. Nevertheless, the power of the models remains quite high
(AUC = 0.755 on average for left panel; AUC = 0.735 on average for
right panel).
In addition to these prediction tests, a number of additional
sensitivity tests were carried out, which are described in the
online appendix. These tests included, among others, corrections
for possible endogeneity between political institutions and
domestic water cooperation and conﬂict, alternative climate
variability indicators, or two-stage regressions estimating the
effect of climate variability on conﬂict/cooperation via economic
performance. In total, the online appendix refers to more than ten
pages that are comprised of nine tables and two graphs. While we
would like to refrain from emphasizing one over the other
robustness checks, all of them are explained in detail in this
appendix. That said, please note that neither of these additional0
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Fig. 5. Out-of-sample prediction: four-way cross-validation exercise. Note: Left panel pertains to estimates of AUC for WES – Cooperation Dummy. Right panel pertains to
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cross-validations that were repeated for 10 different random partitions of the data.
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reported here.
7. Conclusion
In this study, we ask which factors drive domestic water-related
conﬂict and cooperation. Is it the supply of, the demand for water
resources, or institutional restraints against overt social conﬂict?
The empirical analysis provided evidence that demand (primarily,
economic development; to a smaller degree agricultural productiv-
ity and population density) as well as institutional restraint
(primarily, democracy; to a smaller degree political stability)
inﬂuence domestic water-related interaction. But we did not ﬁnd
any indication that short-term variations in water supply, as
captured by precipitation and temperature patterns, matter for
domestic water-related conﬂict/cooperation dynamics. This ﬁnd-
ing speaks to the broader debate on climate security and appears to
substantiate other research that fails to ﬁnd a systematic
relationship between climate variability and more severe forms
of conﬂict, notably armed conﬂict. Social interaction is shaped by
opportunities and restraints determined in large part by the
qualities of the societies themselves – not by nature.
The analysis also revealed that whereas economic development
and democracy seem to tilt the balance of water-related
interaction toward more conﬂictive behavior, this is the case only
for non-violent events; violent conﬂict over water is almost
exclusively a non-democratic phenomenon. Accordingly, demo-
cratic systems may provide opportunities for protest (and a free
press is also more likely to pick up and report conﬂict events), and
development-related processes may put increasing strains on
scarce water resources, thus increasing the conﬂict potential.
Nonetheless, the political institutional mechanisms of these
systems ensure that such conﬂictive interactions are kept at a
manageable, non-violent level.
Drawing on recently compiled data on water-related events
across a broad spectrum of interaction types, from overt violent
conﬂict to high-impact cooperative initiatives (Bernauer et al.,
2012a,b), this analysis provides a signiﬁcant extension to the
literature’s habitual dichotomous treatment of such events.
However, our study has only scratched the surface of understand-
ing drivers of such interactions, and future research should invest
more in modeling, theoretically as well as empirically, when, how,and what kind of cooperation may provide the optimum solution
to imminent water scarcities.
More research is also needed to better understand local
dynamics. This analysis is based on aggregated country-level data,
but it is not unlikely that a more nuanced high-resolution
assessment (see Cederman and Gleditsch, 2009; Fjelde and von
Uexkull, 2012; Wischnath and Buhaug, 2014) may uncover new
dynamics of supply, demand, and restraint-side drivers of water-
and environment-related interaction. Similarly, the variables we
employed in order to capture climate variability should have given
a representative image of variations in local water supply.
However, these proxies may be too abstract. Next to the discussion
we provide in Section 3.2, also consider that water supply may also
be based on groundwater in our sample’s region, which depends on
precipitation levels, but not exclusively. For example, years might
be considered as drought-years due to crop failures caused by a
deleterious distribution of rainfall – despite normal or average
yearly precipitation levels. Other factors – at a more disaggregated
level – are likely to matter as well and could have very different
characteristics and consequences, e.g., ﬂoods, droughts, water
storage capacities, freshwater derived from river basins, or general
water dependency.
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